docs(README): add how-it-works + architecture diagrams and "why the extension" comparison
- assets/how-it-works.png: CLI → extension (native messaging) → your real Chrome - assets/architecture.png: tab groups / service worker / native messaging / CLI - comparison table vs raw-CDP-port tools (web-access) and chrome.debugger (Claude in Chrome): the extension never triggers Chrome 136+'s "Allow remote debugging?" consent dialog, keeps Runtime.enable off (rebrowser clean), scores 0% on CreepJS, and gives per-session tab groups for concurrent agents.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -22,6 +22,47 @@ For basic usage, commands, and API reference, see the [upstream documentation](h
|
||||
| User collaboration | Separate window | Same window, take over anytime |
|
||||
| CAPTCHA | Agent stuck | You solve it, agent continues |
|
||||
|
||||
## How it works
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
Your **agent-browser CLI** talks to a tiny **browser extension** over Chrome
|
||||
**native messaging** — a local inter-process channel, *no network socket, no
|
||||
token, no remote server*. The extension uses `chrome.debugger` to drive the tabs
|
||||
you target in **your own, already-logged-in Chrome**, then hands results back to
|
||||
the CLI. Everything stays on your machine.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
Each `--session` gets its **own colored Chrome tab group**, so multiple agents
|
||||
can share one real browser concurrently without stepping on each other — or your
|
||||
own tabs.
|
||||
|
||||
## Why the extension (not a raw debug port)
|
||||
|
||||
Other local tools drive Chrome over a raw `--remote-debugging-port` (CDP). Since
|
||||
**Chrome 136**, every such connection pops a blocking **"Allow remote debugging?"**
|
||||
consent dialog — and the port has to be enabled up front. Our extension uses
|
||||
native messaging instead: **install once, then zero per-use confirmation.**
|
||||
|
||||
| | **agent-browser-stealth** (this extension) | web-access (raw CDP port) | Claude in Chrome (chrome.debugger) |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Connect method | native messaging — no port, no token | `--remote-debugging-port` | `chrome.debugger` |
|
||||
| **"Allow remote debugging?" popup** | **never** ✅ | **every connection** 🔴 | no |
|
||||
| Uses your real login | yes | yes | yes |
|
||||
| `Runtime.enable` (CDP) leak¹ | **off by default → clean** ✅ | domain enabled | n/a |
|
||||
| CreepJS stealth score² | **0% stealth · 0% headless** ✅ | real Chrome | real Chrome |
|
||||
| Per-session tab groups / concurrent agents | **yes** ✅ | no | no |
|
||||
| Built for the agent-browser CLI | yes | a separate proxy | a single-app assistant |
|
||||
|
||||
> ¹ Verified against [rebrowser-bot-detector](https://bot-detector.rebrowser.net/):
|
||||
> our relay reports `runtimeEnableLeak: 🟢 No leak` and `navigatorWebdriver: 🟢`.
|
||||
> ² Verified against [CreepJS](https://abrahamjuliot.github.io/creepjs/) on the
|
||||
> connected real-Chrome path — see [Anti-detection](#anti-detection).
|
||||
>
|
||||
> The consent dialog isn't hypothetical: a raw-port tool pops it on **every**
|
||||
> attach (Chrome 136+ security). The extension path never does.
|
||||
|
||||
## Install
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user