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Update readme with stealth FAQ

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leeguooooo
2026-03-02 18:32:28 +09:00
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README.md
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@@ -15,6 +15,24 @@ This README focuses on stealth architecture and principles. For full command cov
- Region signals are auto-aligned (locale/timezone/Accept-Language) to reduce mismatch risk.
- Verification/captcha handling is policy-driven (`--risk-mode off|warn|block`).
## FAQ: `agent-browser` vs `agent-browser-stealth`
People often ask this: "What's the anti-detection approach compared to `agent-browser-stealth` on npm?"
- `agent-browser-stealth` on npm is the package name for this fork.
- The CLI keeps upstream-compatible command names (`agent-browser` is still the main executable, with `agent-browser-stealth` as an alias).
- The practical difference vs upstream `agent-browser` is not one single "stealth switch"; it is a defense-in-depth stack designed for anti-bot pressure.
The core idea is layered hardening across the full automation lifecycle:
1. Connection-aware policy: choose the best available stealth capability by mode (local launch/CDP/cloud provider).
2. Fingerprint hardening: patch launch args, CDP metadata, and init-script surfaces before page code runs.
3. Behavioral humanization: non-uniform typing/mouse/wait patterns instead of perfectly mechanical actions.
4. Region coherence: auto-align locale/timezone/language signals to target geography.
5. Risk-aware control loop: detect verification/captcha signals and handle them with explicit `risk-mode` policy.
Goal: reduce detection probability and improve stability in production automation. Non-goal: "guaranteed bypass" on every target.
## Quick Start
### Install
@@ -50,12 +68,12 @@ flowchart TD
### Policy by Connection Mode
| Mode | Stealth Capabilities | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Local Chromium launch | Chromium launch args + CDP UA override + context init scripts | Most complete stack |
| Existing browser via CDP | CDP UA override + context init scripts | No local Chromium arg injection |
| Cloud provider (browserbase/browseruse) | Context init scripts | Remote browser runtime controls launch layer |
| Kernel provider | Context init scripts + provider-managed stealth | Provider-side stealth may also apply |
| Mode | Stealth Capabilities | Notes |
| --------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- |
| Local Chromium launch | Chromium launch args + CDP UA override + context init scripts | Most complete stack |
| Existing browser via CDP | CDP UA override + context init scripts | No local Chromium arg injection |
| Cloud provider (browserbase/browseruse) | Context init scripts | Remote browser runtime controls launch layer |
| Kernel provider | Context init scripts + provider-managed stealth | Provider-side stealth may also apply |
## Principle 1: Always-On Stealth with Explicit Boundaries
@@ -63,7 +81,7 @@ flowchart TD
- Project policy forbids:
- `--profile` / `AGENT_BROWSER_PROFILE`
- `--channel` / `AGENT_BROWSER_CHANNEL`
- Default CLI policy expects an existing browser on CDP `localhost:9333` unless explicit connection options are provided.
- Default CLI policy auto-attaches an existing browser: try CDP `localhost:9333` first, then auto-discovery unless explicit connection options are provided.
## Principle 2: Multi-Layer Fingerprint Hardening